In this episode, we dive deep into Microsoft Threat Intelligence’s latest findings on two critical macOS vulnerabilities that shook Apple’s privacy defenses. The flaws, identified as CVE-2025-31199 (Sploitlight) and CVE-2024-44133 (HM Surf), specifically targeted Apple’s Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework, the system designed to guard user data and manage app permissions. Sploitlight exploited Spotlight’s plugin mechanism to access sensitive files like Photos.sqlite and Apple Intelligence caches, exposing personal geolocation details and private user activities. Meanwhile, HM Surf allowed attackers to tap into Safari data—including browsing history, camera, and microphone—without authorization.
We examine how these vulnerabilities managed to bypass Apple’s multi-layered security approach, from hardware-rooted protections like the Secure Enclave to advanced system defenses like Signed System Volume (SSV) and Kernel Integrity Protection (KIP). Despite Apple’s comprehensive platform security architecture, the incident underscores the evolving sophistication of threat actors targeting macOS.
Apple has since released patches to close these security gaps, but the case raises serious questions: Are the TCC framework and other privacy safeguards enough in the face of increasingly complex exploits? What does this mean for the future of macOS security and the trust users place in Apple’s privacy promises?
Join us as we unpack the technical details of Sploitlight and HM Surf, analyze Apple’s rapid response, and discuss how users and organizations can stay ahead of such privacy-breaching attacks.
#Apple #macOS #Sploitlight #HMSurf #CVE2025_31199 #CVE2024_44133 #cybersecurity #MicrosoftThreatIntelligence #TCC #Spotlight #Safari #AppleIntelligence #dataprivacy #vulnerabilities #SecureEnclave #SignedSystemVolume #KernelIntegrityProtection
