China’s state-backed cybersecurity agency has reignited accusations of American cyber aggression, claiming the United States orchestrated a cyberattack against a bitcoin mining operation in 2020. The assertion, published by the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC), signals a shift in the geopolitical cyber narrative—one that sees China defending the kinds of entities it has historically criticized.
Chinese Agency Points to Foreign Government Hacking Activity
CVERC Claims a Foreign Nation Was Behind the 2020 Breach
The CVERC, a division under China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, has historically analyzed threats from foreign governments and advanced persistent threats (APTs). In this case, the agency points the finger at a foreign nation-state actor—widely interpreted to mean the United States—as perpetrating the 2020 cyberattack on a bitcoin mining facility, though it stops short of naming the U.S. explicitly.
According to the CVERC, the evidence is based on technical tracing and malware characteristics allegedly linking the intrusion to tools reportedly developed by American intelligence operatives. The tools in question bear similarities to those previously attributed to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), elevated by past disclosures from whistleblowers and hacking collectives such as Shadow Brokers.
The Geopolitical Irony of Defending Bitcoin Mining
Chinese Authorities Defend a Sector They Once Suppressed
Perhaps the most striking element of this accusation is that the CVERC is positioning itself as a defender of bitcoin mining—a sector that has been under intense scrutiny and regulatory suppression in China. In past years, Beijing clamped down heavily on mining operations, citing environmental concerns and capital control risks.
This recent shift could signal a tactical narrative adjustment to counterbalance continued U.S. assertions of Chinese cyber espionage activities. While China has usually treated cryptocurrency operations with skepticism, defending one now serves a broader political purpose: framing the U.S. as an aggressor in cyber operations on sovereign territory.
“For an agency that has long vilified American intelligence capabilities, this report doubles down on portraying the U.S. as a global cyber bully,” said an unnamed Chinese cybersecurity analyst quoted in local media.
Evidence Suggests Known U.S. Cyber Tools Were Used
Technical Parallels Drawn to Known NSA Toolkits
CVERC’s analysis traces the use of specific malware families and intrusion techniques that allegedly correspond to the “Equation Group” toolkit—malware widely believed to be linked to the NSA. According to the agency’s technical write-up, the attackers used a combination of backdoors, credential harvesting tools, and encrypted data exfiltration channels.
The implications point to a nation-state with deep capabilities in:
- Operational security
- Malware obfuscation
- Persistent infrastructure access
These hallmarks match previously attributed NSA campaign parameters described in global threat intelligence disclosures. Notably, CVERC claims it observed “modular code blocks” and encryption schemes familiar from prior incidents where American espionage was suspected.
Heightened Rhetoric Amid Technological Decoupling
Cyber Attribution Becomes a Weapon in the Semiconductor and AI Race
This latest accusation underscores the rising use of cyber attribution as a tool in geopolitical competition, especially as the U.S. and China continue their technological decoupling in critical sectors like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing.
By suggesting that American intelligence agencies are willing to disrupt economic systems like cryptocurrency infrastructure abroad, China can present itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator of cyber operations—a narrative inversion from prevailing Western media reports.
From a cybersecurity professional’s standpoint, the case also illustrates the high-stakes utility of attribution frameworks and malware analysis. As more state actors weaponize digital forensics for diplomatic leverage, such narratives will likely increase both in scope and complexity.
Attribution Without Verification Raises Persistent Questions
While CVERC’s technical premise highlights recognizable attack patterns and potentially linked malware code, the broader cybersecurity community remains cautious. Until more verifiable indicators are shared—such as hashes, command-and-control infrastructure, or confirmed infection paths—the industry’s appetite for confirmation will be limited.
However, the political messaging is unequivocal: in China’s eyes, U.S. cyber operations are fair game for public criticism, especially when intersecting with financially sensitive technologies like bitcoin mining. As cybersecurity continues to intersect with geopolitics, professionals must stay attuned to the evolving strategic narratives shaping our understanding of attribution and state-sponsored threats.
