GhostSec – From Hacktivist to Ransomware Warlord

GhostSec evolved from hacktivist roots into a hybrid ransomware threat, using GhostLocker to target global sectors with encryption, extortion, and high-impact double-extortion campaigns.
GhostSec – From Hacktivist to Ransomware Warlord
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    Overview

    GhostSec emerged in 2015 as a hacktivist offshoot of Anonymous, launching campaigns like #OpISIS and targeting extremist groups. Since late 2022, they’ve pivoted into financially motivated cybercrime through their Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) known as GhostLocker, and in partnership with Stormous, operate double-extortion operations under STMX_GhostLocker. Their toolkit now includes website attack tools like GhostPresser and GhostSec Deep Scan, with activity tied to both hacktivism and profit-driven campaigns.

    Known Aliases of GhostSec Ransomware

    • GhostSecMafia
    • GSM
    • Ghost Security
    • GhostLocker (ransomware name)
    • STMX_GhostLocker (in collaboration with Stormous)

    Country of Origin

    Decentralized operations; associated activity and C2 infrastructure (e.g., Moscow-hosted servers) suggest Eastern European ties, but with hacktivist roots in Middle East influence .

    Incident Timeline

    DateEvent
    2015GhostSec forms as part of Anonymous‑linked hacktivists, launching #OpISIS and counter‑extremism campaigns outpost24.com+5socradar.io+5outpost24.com+5
    Jul 2022Claims compromise of Russian hydro-power ICS (Gusinoozerskaya) and Israeli sewage systems (Or Akiva)
    Oct 2023Launches GhostLocker RaaS v1.0, Python‑based encryptor promoted via Telegram at ~$999 per affiliate
    Nov 2023Releases GhostLocker v2.0 (Golang), adds stealth, watchdog persistence, encryption, exfiltration, RSA/GCM etc.
    Jul 2023Launches STMX_GhostLocker joint RaaS with Stormous, targeting 15+ countries and industries
    2023–2024Broad campaigns across energy, telecoms, education, government sectors globally (Brazil, India, etc.)

    ⚠️ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) of GhostSec Ransomware

    File Indicators

    • Extensions: .ghost
    • Ransom note: Ransomnote.html or similar HTML files
    • Dropped JSON config files containing 32-byte ID.

    C2 Domains/IPs

    • 94.103.91.246 (STMX_GhostLocker v2 Golang)

    Malicious File Hashes (SHA-256)

    • 8fa28795e4cd95e6c78c4a1308ea80674102669f9980b2006599d82eff6237b3
    • 8b758ccdfbfa5ff3a0b67b2063c2397531cf0f7b3d278298da76528f443779e9
    • 36760e9bbfaf5a28ec7f85d13c7e8078a4ee4e5168b672639e97037d66eb1d17
    • a1b468e9550f9960c5e60f7c52ca3c058de19d42eafa760b9d5282eb24b7c55f

    Tooling & Artifacts

    • Dropping to %TEMP%/onefile_%PID%_%TIME% followed by DLLs.
    • Usage of Nuitka-compiled binaries for stealth uptycs.com
    • JSON communication payloads to C2 via incrementLaunch.

    Processes & Services

    • Termination of security processes/services
    • Watching for process restarts (watchdog)

    Notable Attacks / Victims of GhostSec Ransomware

    • OpISIS, OpNigeria, OpLebanon, etc.: original hacktivist campaigns from 2015 onward.
    • ICS/OT Systems: Claiming disruption of Belarusian train RTUs in 2023.
    • Israeli Ministry of Defense — Claimed attack in December 2023 by GhostSec targeting critical national defense infrastructure through GhostLocker ransomware.
    • Indonesia’s National Railway Operator — GhostSec claimed responsibility for disrupting rail operations using ransomware and GhostPresser-based tools in early 2024.
    • Canadian Energy Supplier — Targeted as part of GhostSec’s critical infrastructure campaign, where ransomware was deployed to disrupt operations and steal data.
    • Bengaluru-Based Financial Firm — In January 2024, GhostSec affiliates used phishing to access VPN credentials and exploited a vulnerability to exfiltrate 5 million financial and PII records.
    • Brazilian Government Entity — Targeted in March 2024 during a broader double-extortion campaign; systems were encrypted and sensitive data was leaked online.
    • Educational Institute in India — GhostLocker ransomware was deployed against a university, locking student data and demanding ransom under the STMX_GhostLocker operation.
    • Technology Company in Poland — GhostSec exploited exposed web services to deliver ransomware, leaking corporate IP and user data after non-compliance.
    • Manufacturing Enterprise in South Africa — Ransomware used to halt production systems; exfiltrated blueprints and contracts were published on the GhostLocker leak site.
    • Telecom Provider in Turkey — Hit by GhostLocker 2.0 with claims of compromised communications infrastructure and stolen subscriber databases.
    • Real Estate Platform in Morocco — Ransomware attack encrypted all listing data; GhostSec demanded ransom under threat of data auction on the dark web.
    • Ministry of Education in Vietnam — Systems were encrypted and internal documents stolen, with ransom notes threatening public exposure if payment wasn’t made.
    • Private Healthcare Firm in Egypt — GhostLocker ransomware used to encrypt EMR systems; attackers claimed to possess over 250,000 patient files.
    • Industrial Supplier in China — GhostSec targeted a large-scale industrial automation firm using GhostLocker to lock down operational schematics and billing systems.
    • Qatar-Based Oilfield Services Provider — Attacked via STMX_GhostLocker, resulting in a week-long operational disruption and sensitive project files being leaked.
    • State Telecom Company in Uzbekistan — Encrypted core network components, resulting in regional service outages and extortion attempts via Telegram.

    GhostSec Ransomware MITRE ATT&CK™ Tactics & Techniques

    TacticTechniqueID
    Initial AccessExploit Public‑Facing AppsT1190
    Valid AccountsT1078
    ExecutionCommand & Scripting InterpreterT1059
    PersistenceCreate/Modify System ProcessT1543
    Privilege EscalationAbuse Elevation Control MechanismT1548
    Defense EvasionObfuscated Files/InformationT1027
    Impair DefensesT1562
    Credential AccessOS Credential DumpingT1003
    Lateral MovementRemote Services (RDP/SMB)T1021
    ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web ServiceT1567
    ImpactData Encrypted for ImpactT1486

    Malware Strains Used by GhostSec Ransomware

    Common Methods of Infiltration Used by GhostSec Ransomware

    • Initial access via public-facing web vuln exploitation (e.g., WordPress, APIs).
    • Leverage valid credentials for authenticated access.
    • Builder-controlled payloads allowing customization and pre-attack targeting.
    • Process termination of security tools before encryption.
    • Remote services for lateral movement and data exfiltration.
    • Website-targeting tools like XSS injection for data collection or initial foothold dailysecurityreview.com.

    Additional Intelligence about GhostSec Ransomware

    • Organizational Shift: In May 2024, GhostSec announced handing over GhostLocker to Stormous and returning to pure hacktivism, leveraging ransom profits to fund political operations reddit.com+14cybernews.com+14thecyberexpress.com+14.
    • Membership: Founder of Five Families collective (with ThreatSec, Stormous, Blackforums, SiegedSec); SiegedSec was removed late 2023 cybernews.com+4zerofox.com+4thehackernews.com+4.
    • Funding Model: Subscription-based premium channel, affiliate commissions, and ransomware income provide layered monetization outpost24.com.

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