SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA Hijack Telecom Networks to Spy on Calls

Enea reports SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA are compromising mobile operators to intercept calls, SMS and 2FA codes, with Taiwan the primary target of attacks.
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    Telecom security firm Enea has detailed two threat actors that compromise mobile operator networks to intercept calls and text messages: LIMINAL PANDA, a previously known group, and SilentAir, a newly identified actor. Enea says between five and ten operators are confirmed or suspected to be infected, and the true number may reach dozens worldwide, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

    LIMINAL PANDA’s GTPDoor Malware Hides Commands in GTP Traffic

    LIMINAL PANDA’s activity is ongoing in 2026. The group uses GTPDoor, Unix malware that receives hidden commands over GTP-C. Enea’s GTP firewall has blocked several hundred covert sessions at several customers since the first quarter of 2026. In July, POST Luxembourg reported the first detection of GTP-C attacks using the malware.

    GTPDoor v3 Moves to GTP-U and 5G Traffic

    A new version, GTPDoor v3, hides in GTP-U, which 5G networks also use. It relies on libpcap and is harder to detect than earlier versions. Past reporting links LIMINAL PANDA to China with low to moderate confidence.

    SilentAir Attacks Subscribers From Inside Compromised Operators

    SilentAir has been compromising operators since before 2025. Enea assesses with high confidence that it is a state-level actor and with low confidence that it has a link to China. The actor launches SS7 and Diameter signalling attacks from compromised nodes inside operators in at least six Asian countries, and it targets subscribers in about a dozen countries and territories. A connection between SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA is possible but unconfirmed.

    Taiwan’s Officials and Political Figures at the Center

    Taiwan is SilentAir’s main target, including political figures and officials. Attacks come in bursts that range from a handful to several thousand subscribers per month.

    Interception Rates and Silent SMS Probes

    Interception accounts for 18.30 percent of SilentAir’s activity, compared with 2.07 percent for typical surveillance vendors. Enea observed two-factor authentication codes arriving immediately after interception, which suggests the goal is account takeover. The actor also sends silent SMS probes, mostly around midnight, to test whether interception on a target still works.

    Operators as Launch Points Against Other Operators

    The reported impact covers call, SMS and SMS-based two-factor code interception for targeted subscribers. Operators are also used as launch points against other operators, which means a compromised network in one country can become the origin of attacks on subscribers elsewhere. Enea’s report urges operators to filter signalling and GTP traffic.

    Timeline of Enea’s GTPDoor Detections Across Operator Networks

    SilentAir’s operator compromises predate 2025, which makes it the older of the two operations in Enea’s account. LIMINAL PANDA’s GTPDoor activity was blocked by Enea’s GTP firewall from the first quarter of 2026, and POST Luxembourg reported the first detection of GTP-C attacks with the malware in July. Enea’s report arrived on November 16. Enea counts between five and ten operators as confirmed or suspected infections but says the real figure could reach dozens, concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which leaves the geographic scope of the exposure larger than the confirmed list.

    What the Enea Findings Show About Telecom Signalling Security

    The data points to a gap between commercial surveillance and state-level tradecraft. SilentAir’s interception share is nearly nine times that of typical surveillance vendors, which indicates an actor focused on listening to specific people rather than generating broad signalling noise. The pairing of intercepted SMS and immediate 2FA code arrival places the activity in the account-takeover category, extending the risk from privacy loss to access to the targets’ online services.

    Signalling attacks on SS7 have been documented for years, but the combination here of compromised operator nodes and covert GTP channels moves the problem from external abuse of the interconnect to implants inside the carrier. That distinction matters for defenders, because filtering at the network edge does not address traffic that originates from within a trusted operator.

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