Talos: UAT-12643 Hides Overlord RAT Servers on Solana Blockchain

Cisco Talos says UAT-12643 stores encrypted Overlord RAT command server addresses in Solana wallet transactions, a technique that hampers takedowns.
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    Cisco Talos has detailed a campaign by a group it tracks as UAT-12643 that hides command-and-control addresses for its Overlord remote access trojan in transactions on the Solana blockchain. The technique lets operators change servers without redeploying malware and complicates takedown efforts.

    UAT-12643 Stores Encrypted C2 Addresses in Solana Wallet Memos

    Talos describes UAT-12643 as financially motivated. The group places encrypted command-and-control addresses in memos attached to Solana wallet transactions. The Go-based Overlord RAT checks the wallet and reads the current address, so operators can switch servers at any time without pushing a new build to victims.

    Talos assesses with low confidence that the group is aligned with North Korea. That assessment rests partly on earlier use of Overlord by a cluster called UNK_DeadDrop and on a Solana command-and-control technique previously tied to Lazarus. Talos notes that both are also used by other actors, which is why its confidence is low.

    Overlord Resists Removal With a Blue Screen Trigger

    Overlord is built to resist cleanup. Killing the process triggers a Windows Blue Screen, and the malware plants itself in the OEM folder of the Windows Recovery Environment. The RAT listens on port 5173 and uses SeDebugPrivilege.

    Good Game Infostealer and a C++ Clipboard Hijacker

    The toolset includes a Python infostealer named Good Game and a C++ cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. Together with the RAT they point to data and cryptocurrency theft as the operation’s goals.

    An Open Directory Exposed the Group’s Delivery Tooling

    An operational security mistake left an open directory on server 41.216.188.11, running Flask on port 8000. The directory exposed the group’s tools, which Talos catalogued in its report.

    Fake PDF and Windows Update Lures Built With LNK Files

    The exposed PowerShell scripts build LNK files disguised with fake PDF, Word or Windows Update icons. The shortcuts abuse legitimate Windows binaries, MpCmdRun.exe or certutil.exe, to run the payload. Targets are Windows users who receive spoofed documents.

    HTA and MSBuild Execution Routes

    The directory also held other launch methods: HTA files run through mshta.exe, and inline C# inside MSBuild project files. Using built-in Windows utilities in this way lets the group start its payloads through trusted system tools rather than through obviously malicious executables.

    Why Solana-Hosted C2 Complicates Overlord RAT Takedowns

    Hosting the pointer to the command server on a public blockchain makes the infrastructure harder to disrupt, because defenders cannot seize or suspend a wallet entry in the way they can take down a domain or server. The group simply updates the memo to direct infected machines to a new address. The result, as the Talos research frames it, is resilient access and data and cryptocurrency theft.

    Talos published indicators of compromise alongside the research. The reporting gives no victim counts, so the scale of the campaign is not known.

    Why the Low-Confidence Attribution to North Korea Is Hedged

    Talos’s attribution rests on two links, neither of them conclusive. Earlier use of Overlord by UNK_DeadDrop is one, and a Solana command-and-control technique previously tied to Lazarus is the other. Talos itself notes that other actors also use both, which keeps the assessment at low confidence. The financially motivated description of UAT-12643 sits alongside that suspected alignment without contradicting it, since the toolset the researchers found, an infostealer and a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker, is aimed at theft. The open directory on 41.216.188.11 gave Talos a view into the group’s build process that operators normally keep hidden.

    Talos’s decision to publish indicators of compromise gives defenders concrete artifacts to search for, including the exposed server address and the behaviors tied to Overlord such as its Recovery Environment persistence and the port it listens on. The absence of victim counts in the research means the campaign’s reach remains unmeasured, and the group’s financial motivation suggests the operation targets whatever cryptocurrency and credentials its spoofed documents can reach.

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