Tor Issues Another Emergency Release as Relay DDoS Flood Continues

Tor 0.4.9.17 patches security issues and IPv6 denial-of-service protections as a flood of client circuits keeps overwhelming relays and onion directories.
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    The Tor Project released version 0.4.9.17 on November 13 to patch several security issues, including a fix to how the network’s built-in denial-of-service protections handle IPv6, as a flood of client circuits continues to overwhelm relays. It is the second emergency release in under three weeks.

    What Tor 0.4.9.17 Changes for Relay Operators

    Tor developer David Goulet said that relays across the network, most of the operators, are being overwhelmed by the flood of client circuits. He said more defenses are under consideration and that new versions should follow quickly. Relay operators are urged to update immediately.

    Tor 0.4.9.15 Added Three Directory Flood Protections

    The new version follows Tor 0.4.9.15, released less than three weeks earlier, which added three DoS protections against a flood of directory requests. A single relay could see hundreds of circuits per second.

    Operator Reports the Attack Changed Form After the Update

    On November 14, a relay operator reported that the attack changed form about ten minutes after upgrading. Relays became unresponsive and lost HSDir status, which marks them as onion service directory relays. The operator said version 0.4.9.17 does not do enough to shield HSDir relays.

    Speculation About Onion Service Tracking

    The operator speculated that the attacker might be able to deanonymize or track onion services. The Tor Project has issued no such warning, and the claim remains the operator’s own speculation.

    Impact on Relay Capacity and Onion Service Directories

    The reported impact is degraded relay capacity and reduced reliability of the onion service directory. The attack has continued across multiple releases, and a defense added in one version has been followed by a change in attack behavior within minutes of deployment.

    Tor Relay Network Defenses Face Ongoing Circuit Floods

    Goulet’s description of the traffic is that client circuits arrive in a flood that overwhelms relays across the network, not at a small group of them. In the earlier wave, a single relay could see hundreds of circuits per second. The three protections in 0.4.9.15 were aimed at directory requests, and the IPv6 fix in 0.4.9.17 addresses how the existing protections handled IPv6.

    The Tor Project’s position is that more defenses are being considered, and the developers expect new versions to follow quickly. The operator’s report on November 14 stated that the attack changed within about ten minutes of upgrading, which is the only account so far of how the traffic responded to the new release.

    Timeline of Tor’s Two Emergency Releases

    Tor 0.4.9.15 arrived roughly three weeks before 0.4.9.17, and each release answered a different phase of the flood. The first targeted directory requests and the second changed how the DoS protections treat IPv6. Goulet’s statement that new versions should follow quickly signals that the Tor Project does not consider the problem settled, and operators who updated to 0.4.9.17 have already reported that the traffic changed within minutes.

    What the Repeated Emergency Releases Suggest

    The sequence points to an adversary that adjusts to each mitigation. The first set of protections targeted directory request floods; the second addressed IPv6 handling in the existing protections; the operator’s report suggests the traffic then shifted again. Each release has closed one pattern while the volume of circuits remains high.

    Why HSDir Relays Draw Particular Attention

    HSDir relays matter because onion services rely on them to be found. When these relays lose their status, services become harder to reach, which is the reliability effect the operator describes. Whether the attacker has any ability to track services is unconfirmed, and the Tor Project’s silence on the question is the only official position available. The developers’ statement that more versions are expected means operators should expect continued update cycles until the traffic pattern is blunted.

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